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I. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Attorney representing the interests of the Respondents, J. Kahle Becker, appears to 
have become outrageously vicious, if not literally "unhinged", in his emphatic aversion towards a 
certain party opponent in this appeal, and his vituperative display of this uncontrollable diatribe 
expressed towards Dennis J. Sallaz is neither productive nor of any value in addressing the 
uncertain remedy resulting by virtue of the Decision rendered by the District Court. Let's not lose 
sight of the fact Mr. Becker's only claim advanced in the District Court (Count V) on behalf of the 
Respondents, was dismissed by the lower Court upon Motion of the Defendants-Appellants, and 
the Appellants thereafter prevailed in the establishment and existence of their express written 
contract, having been entered into by the rightful and true members on behalf of Real Homes, 
LLC, on January 6, 2006, but the unexpected analysis of that transaction having triggered a 
dissolution of the limited liability company got in the way of the lower Court's willingness or 
perceived ability to redress the injury suffered by the Appellants. 
Mr. Becker's rather unfocused presentation in his Responsive Brief fails to address, even 
marginally, the narrow issue(s) surrounding that specifically address the contract involved in this 
case, and the absence of a meaningful remedy that needs to be provided by the District Court, as 
raised by these Appellants on this appeal. Instead, Mr. Becker has presented this Appellate Court 
with his unrelated and unnecessary personal attack on Mr. Sallaz, all of which is utterly irrelevant 
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to the issues of interest to this Appellate Court, and then, to add insult to injury, Mr. Becker elects 
to say Appellants have produced only a "skeleton of the record" to support this appeal, which only 
serves to further diminish his serious approach to the issues of concern, when it is rather apparent 
the relevant Record, including.five volumes of the Clerk's Record, comprising 841 pages, along 
with almost 1,100 pages of Trial Transcript, as presented to the Court, along with numerous 
relevant trial exhibits, presents the needed substance of the case in sufficient detail to fully address 
the issues presented in this appeal. Mr. Becker has neither cross-appealed any issue, nor has he 
sought to augment or expand any aspect of the Record for consideration in this appellate process. 
Mr. Becker simply chooses to continue on about unrelated matters, both past and pending, 
solely to emphasize his personal resentment and intense lack of appreciation for the sterling and 
brilliant personality of Mr. Sallaz, but needless to say, none of that has any place or value relating 
to the issue(s) on this appeal, and none of his discourse benefits the failed position of the 
Respondents in the proceedings below, nor lends any credence in assisting this Court in any 
fashion with its analysis of the facts and legal theories that should apply in this appeal. Since 
Respondents declined to file any form of a cross-appeal, none of these hostile expressions of 
dislike, about which Mr. Becker has chosen to characterize and lament, are of any merit in finding 
the appropriate remedy that needs to be adjudicated in this case. Most disturbingly, Mr. Becker has 
historically hurled unproven and unsubstantiated charges at both of these opposing individual 
parties, with a sweeping hatred so as to assail childish allegations of fraud, laced with unfounded 
claims of violations of rules of professional conduct, and even barbs that are highly suggestive of 
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engaging in perjury. Offensive remarks of this nature serve only to expose Mr. Becker to ridicule 
for his uncontrollable propensities, as it never serves any worthwhile purpose to engage in such 
verbal attacks, especially uninvited and uncalled for, and although Mr. Becker has been 
encouraged by others, over the years of our ongoing disputes, to quit that reactionary behavior, he 
nonetheless reverts back to this style of attack when he becomes uncomfortable and lacks a viable 
argument to advance; we see this repeatedly, having put up with his behavior for about five years 
now. Recognizing we each have a professional obligation towards each other, and out of deep 
respect for the judiciary and this Appellate Court in particular, please allow Appellants to 
personally take this opportunity to apologize to this Court for Mr. Becker's inappropriate antics 
and insulting behavior, as it appears that only with age and maturity will he be able to see the "error 
of his ways", and at some future date will he be able to look back at this case and feel his inward 
shame, for which us older counsel see in his childish ways right now. We all would appreciate no 
more name-calling, and Mr. Becker's Response Brief is just "over-the-top" with such 
inflammatory and unacceptable remarks. Given the situation he has made it to be, we must submit 
our motion to strike these aspects of his Responsive Brief, as such a remedy of striking some or all 
of his Brief is the appropriate process under these circumstances. 
It is to be noted that Mr. Becker's associate and former co-counsel in this case, John Runft, 
recognized the existence of their obvious conflict of interest, as it had developed, and came to 
realize his compromised role with their involvement in this case, which compelled him to 
withdraw from representation of Respondents' interests, given the inherent conflict that a 
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continuing representation created, from previous representation of Sallaz' interests, as well as the 
conflict now existing within the case itself. See, Sallaz Affidavit, Exhibit. B filed in support of 
the Motion to Strike. What Mr. Becker's reasons for carrying-on with his conflicted representation 
of Respondents' interests, knowing his inherent conflict was of serious concern as perceived not 
only by Mr. Runft, but also Messrs. Sallaz and Trefren - other than the greed for the substantial 
funds Mr. Becker charged and collected from the Rices - has never been made readily clear at the 
time, but the passage of time has caused it to become more apparent, given the events that surfaced 
in March, 2014. Mr. Becker has recently been afforded the distinct opportunity to explain his 
reasons in the appropriate forum (possibly the underlying reason for his insulting outbursts), with 
his required response to the complaint that has been filed against him before the Idaho State Bar. 
See, Sallaz Affidavit, Exhibit A, filed in support of the Motion to Strike. 
In this forum, however, Appellants are unwilling to remain silent in the face of Mr. 
Becker's baseless accusations, as to do so could leave the wrong impression, though it remains our 
intent to take the "high road", if there is such a place or position available in the practice of law. 
His unbridled arrogance and libelous propensity to malign others, under the umbrella of immunity 
in civil litigation, needs to be "subdued somewhat", and more importantly, he needs to be reined 
in. Appellants found it appropriate to challenge those allegations and statements by filing a 
separate Motion to Strike Mr. Becker's Response Brief, as identified in the motion, and supported 
by the accompanying Affidavit of one named Appellant, Dennis J. Sallaz. This motion has been 
filed under the authority of Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, and as further supported by the past 
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precedents of the Idaho Supreme Court, as well as the authority of the United State Supreme Court. 
These verbal attacks Mr. Becker has incorporated in his Responsive Brief simply cannot be 
countenanced as having been made for any value in this appeal; the only objective was to 
maliciously malign Appellants, brought forth in an improper venue with these otherwise libelous 
comments, and recognizing Mr. Becker's misguided intent may have been to appease, Janet Rice, 
it nonetheless represents his reactionary style to an uncomfortable situation, as his having been 
non-suited in this case with the involuntary dismissal of Respondents' claim never set well with 
him. Such behavior, nonetheless, cannot be excused. Just as Mr. Becker's factually unsupported 
theory was to advance that Renee Baird had 100% ownership of the membership rights of Real 
Homes, LLC in 2006, to which he truly knew better, as disclosures were made to him about Ms. 
Baird's propensities, as well as her financial inability to contribute anything during the formation 
of Real Homes in 2001, and that knowledge made such a theory he chose to advance at trial all but 
"dead on arrival", as he knew better, and once the lower court heard the facts in vivid detail from 
Glenn Trefren, and his controlling role and preservation of assets in the Company, and the historic 
documentation of Ms. Baird's past behavior, as well illuminated by Mr. Trefren from his past 
experience of her "appropriating" behavior, it became readily apparent she had no ownership 
involvement, as the lower court so ruled. 
A. The Respondents Have Failed To Respond To The Issues Raised In This 
Appeal, Which Specifically Relate To The District Court's Failure To Provide 
Any Remedy To Appellants That Would Implement The Court's Findings 
Not until the District Court in this case issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
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February 28, 2014 (R., pp. 551-585) did it became evident to any party that although the District 
Court found an "enforceable contract" existed with respect to the 2006 Purchase Agreement, that 
contract, nonetheless, had failed of its essential purpose upon the very date of its execution, 
because the act of executing that contract had allegedly triggered the involuntary dissolution of 
Real Homes, LLC: 
Based upon the evidence before it, the court finds that the property 
transferred by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the 
Agreement constituted all or substantially all of Real Homes, LLC's assets. By 
operation of the terms of the operating agreement and applicable Idaho statutes, 
Real Homes dissolved upon execution of the Agreement. Upon such 
dissolution, Real Homes, LLC's business and affairs were required to be wound up. 
The applicable statute did not authorize the transfer of a member interest in 
the winding up process. Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 25-26. (R., 
pp. 575-76) (bold/underlined emphasis added). 
The District Court had already concluded it was only Real Homes, LLC that was entitled to 
pursue the return of the properties that had been transferred to Real Properties, LLC, as part of the 
execution of the 2006 Purchase Agreement: 
Real Homes, LLC is not a party to the counterclaim and has not asserted 
any claim with respect to the real property transferred to Real Properties, LLC 
pursuant to the Agreement. Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 20. (R., pg. 
570). 
The Appellants (Sallaz and Trefren) had genuinely attempted to perform in good faith the 
2006 Purchase Agreement. The properties, as identified in footnote 2 of the Appellant's Opening 
Brief, were, in fact, transferred to Real Properties, LLC, as contemplated by the parties. See, 
Appellant's Brief, at pg. 10, fn. 2, and pg. 16. Both Sallaz and Trefren did, in fact, transfer their 
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membership interests in Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, as well, placing the entire 
control of Real Homes, LLC, from that time to the present, in the exclusive hands of the Rices, 
Respondents herein. 
Therefore, it remains readily apparent Respondents had absolutely no interest in returning 
the properties to either Real Homes, LLC, or to the Appellants, as the Rices had not only total 
control of the properties, but as a further effort to keep what they had received, they transferred the 
properties to their other limited liability company, known as Ada Properties, LLC, in 2010. The 
reason being Rices before and currently do control each of these companies, Real Homes, LLC, 
Real Properties, LLC, and Ada Properties, LLC, and through these other entities, they hold the 
deeds to the properties transferred to their control under the terms of the 2006 Purchase 
Agreement, and to this day control the properties in one of these entities they own and manage. 
In the Opening Brief in this appeal, Appellants presented and argued three errors that were 
committed by the District Court concerning the absence of a meaningful remedy arising from the 
District Court's decision, in which the Court found Sallaz and Trefren were the only bona fide 
members of Real Homes, LLC. First, the so-called "trigger-event" that caused the involuntary 
dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, upon execution of the Purchase Agreement on January 6, 2006, 
never actually was the occurrence as suggested by the lower court. That trigger event was the 
alleged transfer of the properties from Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC. Because 
Glenn Trefren had earlier feared that Rene Baird was looting assets from Real Homes, LLC, and 
was of a predisposition to wrongfully appropriate its assets and the loan funds received on the 
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15584 Riverside parcel, the deeds to those titled properties had been earlier transferred by Mr. 
Trefren, with the approval of Mr. Sallaz, to Tradesman Contractors & Construction, LLC, where 
they were safely preserved until the transfer to Real Properties, LLC, under the fundamental 
objective intended to be accomplished by the execution of the 2006 Purchase Agreement. 
Consequently, the actual title transfer of those parcels of real property was from Tradesman to 
Real Properties, where title has been held to assure preservation of those assets. Therefore, if the 
title transfer of these parcels ofreal property, from Real Homes to another, is to be considered the 
"trigger-event", causing involuntary dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, it never occurred on 
January 6, 2006, as was found by the District Court, as the activity to preserve the assets was taken 
during the preceding year, as the deed transfers in the Exhibits so reflect. See, Exhibit reflecting 
deed transfers from Tradesman to Real Properties, Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 12 & 16. 
Second, if the parties' contract had failed of its essential purpose as a result of the District 
Court's conclusion that Sallaz and Trefren were then unable to transfer their membership interests 
in Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, then a rescission (upon such a finding) was an 
appropriate remedy, essentially the need for unwinding the parties' agreement, and restoring them 
to their pre-contract positions. See, Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 17. 
Third, if an involuntary dissolution of Real Homes, LLC had been triggered by the parties' 
attempt to execute the 2006 Purchase Agreement, then a judicially supervised completion of that 
process could have been authorized in which the properties could have been returned, and 
appropriate restitution adjustments needed could have been made as a part of the winding-up 
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process in the dissolution of Real Homes, LLC. The pivotal issue presented for decision to the 
district court in the trial below was the essential question: who was entitled to the control of the 
entity, Real Homes, LLC? Not until the District Court issued its memorandum decision on 
February 28, 2014 did any party to this proceeding come to understand the 2006 Purchase 
Agreement could not be enforced due to a finding that Real Homes, LLC had been involuntarily 
dissolved upon the execution of that Agreement. Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 25-26. 
(R., pp. 575-76). No party had ever envisioned, let alone presented any argument of such a theory 
to the District Court during the course of any of the proceedings undertaken before the lower court. 
What is absolutely clear in this case is that only one legal entity, known as Real Homes, 
LLC, exists, and its true and only members were Sallaz and Trefren when the Purchase Agreement 
was executed in 2006, and the Respondents have had the exclusive control of that Entity, the 
membership rights, and these property assets ever since the execution of that Agreement on 
January 6, 2006. In their attempt to fully perform in good faith under the 2006 Purchase 
Agreement, Sallaz and Trefren transferred their membership interests held in Real Homes, LLC to 
Real Properties, LLC, as that it what was agreed would be done, and that Entity was controlled by 
Rices, and Sallaz and Trefren also saw to it that each of the properties, as identified in that 
Agreement, were transferred to Real Properties, LLC, as their agreement required, placing 
everything within the control of Rices, in their Real Properties, LLC entity. From that time to the 
present, Real Homes, LLC has remained under the exclusive control of the Rices, who have 
transferred the deeds to these parcels of real properties as they chose to do. (R., pg. 804, The 
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court expressly determined that the transfer of the membership interests of Sallaz and Trefren did, 
in fact, take place.). 
The only semblance of a response argument made by Respondents, through Mr. Becker in 
his Response Brief, is that Sallaz/ Trefren (their "version" of whom should represent Real Homes, 
LLC) had never entered an appearance on behalf of Real Homes, LLC in the case below, and never 
filed a counterclaim in its behalf, so as to request the return of the properties. See, Respondents' 
Brief at pp. 5 & 7. That argument fails to even rise to the level of a "Red Herring", if such an 
expression of criticism is proper, considering our earlier chastisement of Mr. Becker's callous 
expressions. For him to suggest there exists multiple versions or differing rights to the 
management and control of Real Homes, LLC, for which Rices have alone exercised that authority 
pursuant to the only legal version of the Entity, how does Mr. Becker envision that Sallaz/Trefren 
would be able to ignore their conveyance of and surrender of their membership interests to them, 
their right to management and control of it, and the annual statements reflecting the sole ownership 
and control of the membership rights and sole management filed with the Secretary of State, ever 
since 2006 to the present date. To say Appellants had the right to make an appearance for an entity 
Rices controlled, or file a counterclaim for an entity Rices controlled, is simply illogical and 
non-sense, as only one such legal Entity exists - and has been controlled by the Rices since 2006. 
Just imagine what Mr. Becker would have accused us of doing, had we made an appearance and 
filed a counterclaim on behalf of Real Homes, LLC, when they held exclusive rights since the 
Agreement was made? 
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The distinction between "entities," and their control, has been carefully scrutinized and 
preserved in the analysis of Idaho law undertaken by the Idaho Supreme Court. See e.g., Jayo 
Development, Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 2015 WL 798033 at pp. *5-6, 15.5 ISCR 
70, 76 (February 26, 2015); and Washington Federal Savings v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648,654, 
289 P.3d 50, 56 (2012). In the absence of an order by the District Court, Real Homes, LLC 
remains under the exclusive control of the Rices, the Respondents herein, and Appellants had no 
say or right to interfere with its management and litigation proceedings. 
The District Court's February 28, 2014 decision-that an enforceable contract existed, yet 
that contract could not be enforced - initially presented conceptual difficulties in its reasoning. 
Nonetheless, Sallaz & Trefren did squarely present the question that looms over this appeal in their 
motion for reconsideration, articulated in the Reply Brief submitted to the District Court: 
So the question presented is simply this: Are Messrs Sallaz and Trefren 
now free to go forward on behalf of Real Homes, LLC, either in this action or a 
new action, to obtain full recovery of the real property that was conveyed to Roy 
Rice and his entities (Real Properties, LLC)? Reply Memorandum on Motion for 
Reconsideration, pg. 9, (R., pg. 818) (emphasis added). 
A concern whether the District Court analyzed this specific argument, however, 
remains an issue as well, as that Sallaz & Trefrens' Reply Memorandum on the motion for 
reconsideration was submitted to the District Court on April 8, 2014, and the District Court 
issued its "Order on Motions," prior to the scheduled hearing, by the decision rendered on 
April 9, 2014 (R., pp. 800-808), such that it is highly unlikely the District Court saw, much 
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less considered, those arguments. 1 
Absent some action by the District Court compelling the Rices to return the membership, 
management, and control of Real Homes, LLC, along with the return of the real properties 
currently held in Ada Properties, LLC, to Sallaz & Trefren, there remains no meaningful avenue 
by which the District Court's decision can be implemented to provide a meaningful remedy in this 
dispute over the transaction. The properties - wherever title transfer has gone - remain in the 
control of the Rices, as does Real Homes, LLC, which is precisely why Respondents claim the 
only entity entitled to demand the return of the properties, due to any failure of the 2006 Purchase 
Agreement, rests with Real Homes, LLC, and they alone own it, they alone control it, and from 
their standpoint, that brings an end to it. Doesn't that justify the application of equitable estoppel or 
quasi-estoppel to their bad faith attempt to keep what they haven't paid for? The law is certainly 
not predisposed to endorse fraud or bad faith conduct, and Respondents are simply advocating a 
bad faith position in just that very manner. 
Because the failure of this Purchase Agreement arose upon a judicially declared 
involuntary dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, if the occurrence of that dissolution is upheld on 
appeal, it would require a continuing and consistent order of the District Court to complete the 
dissolution process that it had declared to have been triggered by the real property transfers. 
Prior to the District Court's issuance of its April 9, 2014, "Order on Motions," the 
matter had been noticed for a hearing on April 10, 2014, (R., pg. 16), such that the "Reply 
Memorandum" was timely submitted under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E), so long as "received" two days 
prior to the date of that hearing. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF -PAGE 16 
Under subsection (2), §53-643 of the "LLC Act," the District Court could enter a decree of 
dissolution and then, "direct the winding up and liquidation of the limited liability company's 
business and affairs in accordance with §53-644,... The provisions of subsection (2) of §53-644 
are broad enough to allow the District Court to supervise the recovery of the properties from the 
Rices, 2 for the purpose of ultimately liquidating that property as a part of the dissolution of Real 
Homes, LLC. 
On the other hand, if this Appellate Court should determine upon this appeal that Real 
Homes, LLC should not have been found to have been involuntarily dissolved by the mere act of 
executing the 2006 Purchase Agreement, then, as based upon the District Court's finding that the 
2006 Purchase Agreement was an eriforceable contract between Sallaz & Trefren and Real 
Properties, LLC, it would lawfully follow that Sallaz & Trefren should be entitled to a remedy for 
the breach of that agreement by Real Properties, LLC, either in the nature of damages for breach of 
an express contract, or in the nature of restitution arising out of either rescission or unjust 
enrichment to the Rices. 
Other than the lack of a meaningful remedy, the District Court rendered a decision entirely 
favorable to Appellants, finding that Sallaz and Trefren not Renee Baird - were the only bona 
fide "members" of Real Homes, LLC, and that Sallaz and Trefren had entered into an enforceable 
2 As noted in Sallaz & Trefrens' Opening Brief in this appeal, the Rices Respondents 
are believed to have transferred the Properties from Real Properties, LLC to another entity that 
Roy Rice had controlled, known as Ada Properties, LLC. (Rice, Tr., pg. 529, L. 24 to pg. 530, L. 
4), in whose ownership they are believed to remain to this day. 
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contract with Real Properties, LLC by their execution of the 2006 Purchase Agreement. This 
finding by the District Court eliminated the only remaining claim the Rices had in this case at the 
time of trial, - the so called, Count V claim as the District Court declared in the statement of its 
findings: 
Based on the lack of any evidence that Ms. Baird provided consideration in 
exchange for her claimed interest in Real Homes, the court concludes that 
Plaintiff has not established that Ms. Baird was a member, much less the only 
member, of Real Homes, LLC at the time of execution of the Agreement. 
Since Plaintiff based its Count V breach of contract claim on establishing that Ms. 
Baird was the only member of Real Homes, LLC, the court also concludes that 
Plaintiff failed to prove all the required elements of its Count V breach of contract 
claim and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V must be granted. [footnote 
omitted] Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 19, (R., pg. 569, bracketed 
reference and emphasis added). 
The Appellants did provide a statement in their Opening Brief in this appeal as it related to 
the fact this finding, as made by the District Court, was contrary to the proposed findings that 
Rices were unsuccessful in getting the District Court to admit as an exhibit in this case. The lower 
court expressed several reasons why it would neither admit nor consider those findings of the 
magistrate in this case. The magistrate court, in the Sallaz divorce, announced by Judge Epis, had 
found Renee Baird was a 100% owner of Real Homes, LLC. See, Appellant's Brief, pg. 11, fn. 3. 
The District Court declined to embrace any of those findings of the divorce court, as neither Real 
Homes, LLC, nor Glenn Trefren, were ever parties to that divorce proceeding, raising concerns 
over both subject matter jurisdiction and in personum jurisdiction, and that Entity and what 
appears to be other member(s) were the significantly impacted parties to this contract, and were 
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not part of the divorce. 
Although Mr. Becker, in behalf of Rices, had strongly urged the District Court to adopt the 
findings made in the Sallaz divorce proceeding, Judge Kerrick determined differently, especially 
when given the facts presented, and her need to make independent findings, based upon the 
testimony and evidence presented, which then compelled the result as to whom comprised the true 
of Real Homes in this case, as Ms. Baird could never sustain her claim to any membership or 
ownership of Real Homes, LLC, let alone a claim she was the sole member as she had before 
claimed in the divorce case, given the complete lack of any support to establish any contribution 
by any evidence to establish her claim to be a factually supported contention. Of interest, Ms. 
Baird was Mr. Becker's first witness to testify in support of Rices' ill-fated and unsubstantiated 
contention Ms. Baird claim, and her complete lack of any factual basis to support her contentions 
became more obvious as both the direct and cross-examination process created a complete record, 
along with the testimony of both Sallaz and Trefren as to their contributions that created the entity, 
and Mr. Baird having contributed nothing, having had nothing, as her testimony revealed. 
To any extent the Rices have provided any argument in response to the issues raised by 
Appellants, it appears only to be in the context to urge this Appellate Court to simply affirm the 
District Court's decision. See, Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-12. Apparently then, as based upon 
their sparse argument, they have no quarrel with the District Court's correct decision concerning 
its finding that Real Homes, LLC was owned, controlled, and managed by Sallaz and Trefren only, 
and they represented the limited liability company's only bona fide members, at the time of the 
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2006 Agreement, and at the time any relevant transfers were made, and when the entity was 
transferred to Real Properties, LLC, undertaken in good faith to perform in accordance with the 
fundamental purpose and objectives to be accomplished under the 2006 Purchase Agreement. 
The significant issues raised and presented in this appeal, which the Rices have not 
meaningfully addressed, is the District Court's failure to provide any remedy in implementing its 
February, 2014 Memorandum Decision. In summary, then, this Court could order the District 
Court to: 
1. Administer a judicially supervised dissolution of Real Hornes, LLC. 
2. Hold that no dissolution of Real Hornes, LLC ever arose, and remand to the District 
Court for enforcement of the breach of the express contract, upon the breach of 
Real Properties, LLC., or in the alternative for restitution type remedies to be 
imposed in the nature of restitution arising out of either rescission or that of unjust 
enrichment. 
B. The Respondents Have Not Have Opposed The Award Of Attorney's Fees To 
Appellants, Should They Prevail In This Appeal 
The Rices offer no argument in their Respondents' Brief to oppose Appellants' request for 
an award of attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-120(3), should Sallaz and Trefren prevail in this appeal, 
and for a corresponding award of attorney's fees in the proceeding below under LC. § 12-120(3), 
upon any remand, should Sallaz and Trefren prevail in this appeal. Arguments which are not 
raised in a party's initial brief, supported by relevant legal citation, cannot be raised for the first 
time at oral argument. Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); and 
Morgan v. Sexual Offender Classification Board, 148 Idaho 196, 199,220 P.3d 314, 317 (2009). 
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C. The Respondents Are Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees In This Appeal 
As an "additional issue on appeal" Rices have requested an award of attorney fees pursuant 
to I.A.R. 40 and 41. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides for an award of costs on appeal, and Rule 
41 specifies the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees on appeal. "Neither rule 
provides the authority for awarding attorney fees." See Edwards v Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 520, 300 P.3d 43, 52 (2013). A request for attorney 
fees must be supported by both argument and authority. Citation to statutes and rules authorizing 
fees, without more, is insufficient. Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270, 220 P .3d 
1080, 1089 (2009). Even argument with citation to a supporting statutory or contractual basis is 
insufficient. See Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 422, 196 P.3d 325, 340 (2008) (Because the 
Plaintiff has not cited any statutory or contractual authority supporting his request for an award of 
attorney fees, he cannot be awarded attorney fees.). 
Here the Rices provide limited argument, though no citation to statutory authority to 
support their request, therefore their request for attorney's fees must be summarily denied. 
Appellants fundamentally disagree with Rices' argument this appeal is frivolous, as it remains 
undisputed the fundamental issue of contractual authority to enter into the Purchase Agreement 
was decided in Appellants favor, and they prevailed below, but were denied a remedy on the basis 
the district court failed to fashion a mechanism for the return of the control of Real Hornes, LLC to 
Sallaz and Trefren, along with the return of the real properties, so that a meaningful remedy could 
be implemented. Absent that failure to order the relief and action required, full relief could have 
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been afforded to these Appellants,, and this appeal would have been rendered unnecessary. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court, denying Sallaz and Trefren damages for breach of what 
the District Court found to be an enforceable express contract that had been breached, with 
resulting damages, should be reversed, and damages awarded. If such damages cannot be 
awarded for the breach of that enforceable express contract, then in the alternative, Sallaz and 
Trefren must be afforded a remedy in the nature of restitution arising out of either rescission or 
unjust enrichment. 
If the District Court is reversed, or remanded with instructions, such that Appellants are the 
prevailing parties, Sallaz and Trefren should be awarded~~~~ prevailing 
"/- -,~-
parties in the proceeding below as well, under LC. 1f IL-120(3). "",,,,, 
If Sallaz and Trefren are determined to be the evailing parties ~should 
be awarded their reasonable attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-120(3) m uing this appeal.] 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2015. 
Vernon K. Smit 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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